Stochastic control problems that do not satisfy the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as games and look for equilibrium controls instead of optimal controls. The main result of the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent stochastic control is a verification theorem based on the extended HJB system. It says that solving the extended HJB system is a sufficient condition for equilibrium. In the present paper we show that solving the extended HJB system is a necessary condition for equilibrium, under regularity conditions. The controlled process is a general Itô diffusion.
Introduction
Consider a controlled process X u with initial data (t, x) and the problem of choosing a control u that maximizes
where the functions F and G are deterministic. This problem is inconsistent in the sense that if a control u is optimal for the initial data (t, x) then u is generally not optimal for other initial data (s, y). This means that the dynamic programming principle does hold. Control problems of this kind are known as time-inconsistent.
Time-inconsistent problems are typically studied using either a game-theoretic approach, a pre-commitment approach or using the notion of dynamic optimality. For a comparison see [5, 15, 16] .
The game-theoretic approach is to interpret the problem as an optimization problem for a person whose preferences change when (t, x) changes. The person is interpreted as comprising versions of herself, one version for each (t, x). These versions of the person are interpreted as agents playing a sequential game regarding how to control the process X u . The game-theoretic approach is formalized by the definition of equilibrium.
Time-inconsistent problems were first studied in finance and economics. Here the time-inconsistency arises mainly due to non-exponential discounting, endogenous habit formation and mean-variance utility; for a description see [3, 5] . Each of these types of problems can be formulated and studied in the framework of the present paper.
The game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistency was first used in [18] where utility maximization problems were studied. Other influential papers on timeinconsistency in economics and finance include [12, 14, 17, 19] . Early papers of a more mathematical kind include [9, 10, 11] where non-exponential discounting was studied. The first general results on the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent stochastic control are due to the authors of [2, 3] who defined the extended HJB system, which is a system of simultaneously determined PDEs, and proved the aforementioned verification theorem. Similar PDE approaches for particular problems were studied in [1, 10, 11] . The game-theoretic approach was also studied in [20, 21, 22] , although there a slightly different equilibrium definition compared to that of [2] and the present paper was used. In [8] , the equilibrium of a time-inconsistent control problem was characterized by a stochastic maximum principle. Mean-variance optimization is likely the most studied time-inconsistent problem. Different versions of this problem have recently been studied in [4, 6, 7, 16] . A class of related problems are the timeinconsistent stopping problems, see e.g. [5] and the references therein. For more comprehensive surveys of the literature on time-inconsistent problems we refer to [3, 5, 15, 16] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the timeinconsistent stochastic control problem in more detail and give the definition of equilibrium. In Section 3 we define the extended HJB system and prove the main result, Theorem 3.9. To illustrate the main result we study a simple example in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 contains a more general version of the main result.
Problem formulation
Consider a stochastic basis (Ω, F , P, F ) where F is the augmented filtration generated by a d-dimensional Wiener process W . Consider a constant time horizon T < ∞ and an n-dimensional controlled SDE
) are continous and satisfy standard global Lipschitz and linear growth and conditions, see e.g. [13, sec 5.2] . M (n, d) denotes the set of n × d matrices.
We also consider a control constraint mapping U : [0, T ] × R n → 2 R k that will be used to restrict the class of admissible controls, see Definition 2.2. It is throughout this paper assumed that U and the functions F and G in (1) satisfy Assumption 2.1.
Definition 2.2 The set of admissible controls is denoted by U. A control u is said to be admissible if the following conditions hold:
• For each initial data point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , the SDE (2) has a unique strong solution with the Markov property, denoted by X u , satisfying
We are now ready to define the equilibrium for the time-inconsistent stochastic control problem corresponding to (1) in line with [2] . For a motivation of this type of equilibrium see [2, 3] .
Definition 2.4 (Equilibrium)
• Consider a point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , two controls u,û ∈ U and a constant h > 0. Let
• The controlû ∈ U is said to be an equilibrium control if, for any fixed initial data (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and any u ∈ U, it satisfies the equilibrium condition
• Ifû is an equilibrium control then Vû defined by Vû(t, x) = J(t, x,û) is said to be the corresponding equilibrium value function and the quadruple (û, Vû, fû, gû) is said to be the corresponding equilibrium.
The following definition will be used throughout this paper.
Definition 2.5
• The differential operator A u corresponding to the controlled SDE (2) is defined by
• For a function f : [0, T ] × R n × R n → R placing the third variable as a superscript, f y (t, x) = f (t, x, y), means that y is supposed to be taken as a constant parameter. For example, f y ∈ C 1,2 ([0, T ) × R n ) means that f (t, x, y) is continuously differentiable with respect to t and twice continuously differentiable with respect to x for a fixed y and A u f y (t, x) involves only derivatives with respect to t and x. Moreover, A u f (t, x, x) should be interpreted as A uf (t, x) withf (t, x) := f (t, x, x).
• For a function g :
• We use the notation
We remark that (1), Definition 2.3, Definition 2.4 and (5) directly imply that
The main result
Let us first define the extended HJB system in line with [2] .
wherē
Remark 3.2 For a fixed functionū the equations (7) and (8) are Kolmogorov backward equations. For fixed functions f and g the equation (9) is an HJB equation. The non-standard attribute of (7)- (9) is thatū, f and g are not fixed in this way. Instead, (7)- (9) is system that is simultaneously determined through (10). Let us describe what constitutes a solution: If four functions
n , satisfy the following conditions then (ū, V, f, g) is a solution to the extended HJB system:
• The functions f y andū satisfy (7), for each fixed y ∈ R n .
• The functions g andū satisfy (8).
• The boundary condition V (T, x) = F (x, x) + G(x, x) is satisfied.
• For each fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×R n , the inequality
x) ≤ 0 holds for each constant u ∈ U (t, x), and it holds with equality for the constant u :=ū(t, x).
In order to prove the main result of the this paper, Theorem 3.9, we need Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 3.6 below. We remark that Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 are versions of the Feynman-Kac formula. A proof is included for the sake of completeness. We will use the following definition.
Lemma 3.4 Consider a continuous control u ∈ U. Suppose that the auxiliary function f u satisfies f
and the boundary condition is therefore immediately satisfied. Consider an arbitrary point (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ) × R n × R n . Let X u be the strong solution to the SDE (2) for the initial data (t, x). Consider an arbitrary constant h > 0, satisfying t + h < T . The Markov property gives us
From Itô's formula we obtain,
where the Itô integral vanished since f
The condition f y u ∈ L 2 T (X u ) implies that we can use dominated convergence when sending sending h ց 0 in (11) . Moreover, the integrand in (11) is continuous in s, since µ, σ and u are continuous and f
The result follows from (11) and (12).
Lemma 3.5 Consider a continuous control u ∈ U. Suppose that the elements of the auxiliary function
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3.4 and is omitted.
Proposition 3.6 Consider two controls v,ṽ ∈ U where v is continuous. Suppose that the auxiliary functions fṽ and gṽ satisfy f
, for any fixed y ∈ R n and i = 1, ..., n. Consider the initial data (t,
and
where v := v(t, x).
Proof. Consider the initial data (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and an arbitrary constant h > 0 satisfying t + h < T . Using Itô's formula we obtain 
From the above follows that
Using arguments analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 3.4 we thus obtain
which, since v := v(t, x), means that (13) holds. Using the same arguments as above we obtain
Standard Taylor expansion gives us
Hence,
which means that (14) holds.
Let us now define what we mean by a regular equilibrium and prove the main result.
Definition 3.7 An equilibrium (û, Vû, fû, gû) is said to be regular if:
(i). The equilibrium controlû is continuous.
for each fixed y ∈ R n and i = 1, ..., n, wheref (t, x) := fû(t, x, x).
(iii). For each (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×R n and each u ∈ U (t, x), there exists a continuous control u ∈ U with u(t,
Regarding the technical condition (iii) we remark that Assumption 2.1 ensures that for each (t, x) and each u ∈ U (t, x), there exists a continuous control u with u(t, x) = u.
Remark 3.8 A simple problem with a regular equilibrium is studied in Section 3.1.
Theorem 3.9 A regular equilibrium (û, Vû, fû, gû) solves the extended HJB system.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.4 that the auxiliary function f ŷ u (t, x) and the equilibrium controlû satisfy (7), for each y ∈ R n . It follows from Lemma 3.5 that the auxiliary function gû(t, x) andû satisfy (8) . Sufficient regularity for the use of these lemmas is provided by (i) and (ii) in Definition 3.7.
The boundary condition V (T, x) = F (x, x) + G(x, x) in (9) is trivially verified using (5), (6) and Definition 2.3.
Consider an arbitrary point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n . In order to prove that the equilibrium (û, Vû, fû, gû) is a solution to the extended HJB system we only have left to show that the following inequality holds for any u ∈ U (t, x) and that it holds with equality for u :=û(t, x):
Consider an arbitrary u ∈ U (t, x). It directly follows from (6) that
where differentiability is provided by (ii) and Assumption 2.1. Consider a continuous control U satisfying u(t, x) = u such that the regularity condition f
We may then use Proposition 3.6 to obtain,
where we in the last step used (16) . Now use the definition of J(t, x, u) to obtain
where the inequality is due to the assumption thatû is an equilibrium control, cf. the equilibrium condition (3). Recall that u ∈ U (t, x) was arbitrarily chosen. Hence, (17) and (18) imply that (15) holds for any u ∈ U (t, x).
Since f ŷ u andû satisfy (7) for any y we know that Aûf x u (t, x) = 0. Since gû andû satisfy (8) we know that Aûgû(t, x) = 0 which with (4) gives us Hûgû(t, x) = 0. From (6) we know that AûVû(t, x) = Aûfû(t, x, x) + AûG ⋄ gû(t, x). Hence,
This means that (15) holds with equality for u :=û(t, x).
An example
To illustrate Theorem 3.9 we here study a very simple time-inconsistent control problem described as follows. The controlled SDE is one-dimensional and given by
where σ > 0 is constant. Admissible controls are restricted to the interval U = [−a, a] for some constant a > 0. The functions F and G are defined by F (x, y) = (x − y) 2 and G(x, y) = 0. This implies that
We make the ansatz that an equilibrium control is given byû = 0. With simple calculations we obtain the corresponding auxiliary functions, gû(t, x) = x, and fû(t, x, y) = (x − y) 2 + σ 2 (T − t).
It follows that, Let us now show that the controlû = 0 does indeed satisfy the equilibrium condition (3). Consider an arbitrary control u ∈ U and an arbitrary point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R. Using Itô's formula and the derivatives above we obtain Using arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 3.6 we also obtain E t,x f x u (t + h, X u t+h ) = f u h (t, x, x). Hence, f u h (t, x, x) − fû(t, x, x) = E t,x t+h t u(s, X The definition of a regular equilibrium is analogous to that of Definition 3.7. Theorem 3.11 generalizes the main result of this paper to the present setting.
Theorem 3.11 A regular equilibrium (û, Vû, fû, gû) solves the extended HJB system II.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.9 and is omitted.
